Harry L. Young & Sons v. Industrial Commission of Utah, and Dennis A. Ashton : Plaintiff\u27s Breif by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1975
Harry L. Young & Sons v. Industrial Commission of
Utah, and Dennis A. Ashton : Plaintiff 's Breif
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Wendell Bennett; Strong and Hanni; Attorneys for Plaintiff Petitioner .
Unknown.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Sons v. Industrial Commission of Utah, No. 13866.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1975).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/97
UTAH nvAii 
DOCUMENT U T A H SUP»EME COURT I 
45.9
 y 9%€F f 
UJF i r i L OAX».JLJ^ ^* tI JTA1J 
HARRY L. YOUNG & SONS, IfflWGHAtt YOUl , JSJIVKSITY 
Plaidiffpufyn Ck...': LJM.V Seta*?! 
- vs-
Case No. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ' 1 3 8 6 6 
OF UTAH, and 




APPEAL FROM AN AWARD MADE BY THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
iBHIIP 
WENDELL BENNETT 
STRONG & HANNI 
604 Boston Building 
Phone 532-7080 M 




Clerk. Simreme Court. Ufeh 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE .... 1 
DISPOSITION IN INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION .... 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ASHTON WAS AN INDEPENDENT CON-
TRACTOR, AND WAS NOT AN EMPLOYEE 
OF YOUNG FOR WORKMEN'S COMPEN-
SATION PURPOSES 5 
CONCLUSIONS 17 
CASES CITED 
Christean v. Industrial Commission, 
113 U. 451, 196 P. 2d 502 8 
Gallegos v. Stringham, 
21 U. 2d 139, 442 P. 2d 31 12, 14, 15, 17 
Kinder v. Industrial Commission, 
106 U. 448,150 P. 2d 109 12, 13, 14, 15, 17 
Luker Sand and Gravel v. Industrial Commission, 
82 U. 188, 23 P. 2d 225 12, 13, 14, 15, 17 
Maryland Casualty Company v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 12 U. 2d 223, 364 P. 2d 1020 11 
Sutton v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
9 U. 2d 339, 44 P. 2d 538 12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HARRY L. YOUNG & SONS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
- vs-
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, and 
DENNIS A. ASHTON, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFFS BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action is a petition for review of a workmen's 
compensation award made by the defendant Industrial 
Commission to the defendant Ashton as a result of injuries 
allegedly sustained as a result of an industrial accident on 
August 26, 1973, at Tempe, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The defendant Industrial Commission ruled that the 
defendant Ashton was an employee of Harry L. Young 
& Sons, Inc. for workmen's compensation purposes and 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
The plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Industrial Com-
mission's Finding and Order entered in the above-entitled 
case, and for a determination that the defendant Ashton 
was not an employee of Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc., but 
that he was an independent contractor. 
:i- STATEMENT OF FACTS *. 
In March, 1973, Ashton was contacted by Charles 
Dinneen who had a truck leased to Harry L. Young & 
Sons, Inc., who asked him to act as one of the drivers 
on his truck. (R 18-19) 
Inasmuch as Dinneen was operating as a lease opera-
tor for Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc., which is a regulated 
interstate motor carrier subject to the Motor Carrier Safety 
Regulations, it was necessary for the safety director of 
Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. to verify Ashton's qualifica-
tions to operate a leased vehicle under the Motor Carrier 
authority of Young. 
At the time Ashton filled out his application so that 
Young could make a determination as to whether he met 
the Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, it was explained to 
him that the purpose of the processing of the papers was 
to determine whether he was qualified for driving under 
Department of Transportation and Company Safety Regu-
lations, and he signed a form acknowledging that, which 
was a part of the paper work involved with Young's 
compliance with the Motor Carrier Safety Regulations and 
which set out the fact that he was not a Young employee. 
(R 185, Exhibit # 3 ; and, R 208, Exhibit # 2 3 4 
I 
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From March of 1973, to July of 1973, Ashton drove 
the truck owned by Dinneen and being leased for freight 
hauling purposes to Young, and also drove for another 
lease operator, Guy Sainsbury, after Dinneen's truck was 
wrecked. (R 41). While driving for both Dinneen and 
Sainsbury, he received his pay for services to them from 
the Intermountain Accounting Corporation which handled 
their accounting and disbursing for them. (R 186-188, 
Exhibits 4, 5 and 6) 
In July, 1973, Ashton ceased driving for either 
Dinneen or Sainsbury, and entered into a lease purchase 
agreement with a corporation known as Inland Trans-
port, Inc., a Utah corporation, for the lease with an option 
to purchase of a Kenworth Tractor. (R 189, Exhibit 7) 
Under that Lease-Purchase Agreement, Ashton was obli-
gated to pay $585.28 per month for 34 months, plus 
$26.34 use tax, and to maintain insurance on the vehicle, 
and keep the vehicle in appropriate repair. At the time 
Ashton entered into the Lease-Purchase Agreement with 
Inland Transport, Inc., and for the purpose of using said 
vehicle for his gain, he entered into a Lease Agreement 
with Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc., referred to in the 
Agreement to maintain reserve account, (R 190, Exhibit 
8), and in order to guarantee the Lease-Purchase payments 
to Inland Transport, Inc., as required under the Lease-
Purchase Agreement, he entered into an additional agree-
ment with Inland Transport, Inc. to maintain a reserve 
account with Intermountain Accounting Corporation from 
which Inland Transport, Inc. would receive their monthly 
Lease-Purchase payment, and Ashton would have avail-
able funds reserved in that account for the payment of his 
i 
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maintenance and repairs, the payment of his tire replace-
ment, the payment of his insurance, the payment of 
his license and taxes, and the payment of his drivers. (R 
190, Exhibit 8). At a later date, he executed a Power of 
Attorney giving one E. D. Snider the power and authority 
to endorse drafts issued by Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. 
for the limited purpose of depositing same in the account 
of Intermountain Accounting Corporation to make possi-
ble the proper handling of that reserve account. (R 190, 
Exhibit 16). 
After Ashton entered into the Lease-Purchase Agree-
ment with Inland Transport, Inc. in July, 1973, and then 
started pulling loads for Young, he was paid on a per mile 
basis by Young depending upon the type of commodity 
being hauled, the weight of the load, and the distance he 
pulled the load with his tractor. From those settlements 
with Young, there were no usual employee deductions 
made such as F.I.C.A., Federal Withholding Tax, State 
Withholding Tax, or the like. (R 111-115) 
He received in full all of the revenue earned for 
pulling loads on Young's authority, with the net amount 
being paid into Intermountain Accounting, Inc. pursuant 
to the assignment he had made so that they could take 
care of his operating expenses and truck payment, and he 
received the remaindei- of the gross settlement from Young 
without any deductions whatsoever. (R 117-119) 
In the operation of his tractor, Young at no time 
paid any of the operating costs of same, but only paid 
him on a per mile basis for the freight hauling he did for 
4 
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Young. He took care of all of his own maintenance and 
repair of the truck, payment of his trip permits, payment 
for his co-driver, and was also fully responsible for the 
procurement of all of his overweight permits, and the 
payment for same. (R 98-99, 111, 123, 124, 127, 152). 
In transporting a load of freight, Ashton would 
submit a trip plan to Young, and on that trip plan would 
list certain check-in points. He did not, however, neces-
sarily have to follow that trip plan, and on several 
occasions failed to do so. He could arrive one or more 
days late without penalty, change his course in any way he 
wanted, with the only requirement being that he get the 
freight to its ultimate destination, and could refuse to 
take loads of freight at any time he desired. (R 103-119, 
127, 162,165) 
It was while Ashton was hauling freight, under the 
above relationship between the parties, that he had an 
accident and injured his back. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ASHTON WAS AN INDEPENDENT CON-
TRACTOR, AND WAS NOT AN EMPLOYEE 
OF YOUNG FOR WORKMEN'S COMPEN-
SATION PURPOSES. 
The Industrial Commission predicated their findings 
of fact and conclusions of law upon an erroneous assump-
tion that Inland Transport, Inc., was a financing agency 
8 
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of Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc., and that Intermountain 
Accounting Corporation acted as paying agents of Harry 
L. Young & Sons, Inc. (R 245) The Industrial Commis-
sion also made the erroneous assumption that Harry L. 
Young & Sons was leasing a truck to Ashton; whereas, 
the record clearly shows that Inland Transport, Inc. was 
the only company that ever leased a truck to Ashton, and 
that Ashton's relationship with Young was to use that 
truck that he had leased from Inland Transport, Inc. to 
haul freight for Young. 
At no place throughout the 165 pages of transcript or 
in the 24 exhibits is there any evidence at all to support 
the erroneous assumption upon which findings of fact 
were predicated that Inland Transport, Inc. was a financing 
agency of Young or that Intermountain Accounting Cor-
poration was a paying agent of Young. 
Exhibits 15, 15A, 17 and 18 all show that Ashton 
was being paid by Young as a lessor, and that he in turn 
paid the money into Intermountain Accounting Corpo-
ration who in turn, pursuant to an agreement that he had 
entered into directly with them, would pay his truck pay-
ments, his maintenance, insurance and the like, but there 
is nothing in those exhibits or in the testimony given be-
fore the Industrial Commission that would indicate that 
Intermountain Accounting Corporation was the agent of 
Young. 
Exhibit 4, which are the check stubs that Ashton re-
ceived while he was driving for Dinneen and Sainsbury 
indicate also, as does Ashton's testimony that he was the 
« 
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employee of Dinneen and Sainsbury and not Young, that 
Intermountain Accounting Corporation was acting as an 
accounting service to several lease operators, and not as 
a disbursing organization for Young. 
The lease agreement, Exhibit 7, is between Inland 
Transport, Inc., not as an agent or a division of Young, 
but as a separate corporation and Ashton. Nothing within 
that document, or the testimony in the record would indi-
cate that Inland Transport, Inc. was "a financing agency 
of H. L. Young & Sons." Without any evidentuary sup-
port for the proposition that Inland or Intermountain are 
divisions of or agents for Young, we must look at the 
relationship that existed between Young and Ashton to de-
termine their relationship one to another. In making this 
examination, it must be kept in mind that Young is a 
regulated Interstate Motor Carrier subject to the Motor 
Carrier Safety Regulations and must, by necessity, inas-
much as freight is being hauled under their authority, 
make sure that the freight is hauled in compliance with 
Motor Carrier Safety Regulations. 
In complying with the Motor Carrier Safety Regula-
tions, Young's Safety Director at the time Ashton went 
to work for Dinneen, took an application for employ-
ment in compliance with the Motor Carrier Safety Regula-
tion 391.23 and administered a written examination (Ex-
hibit 3), after which it issued Ashton a Driver's Certificate 
of Qualification (Exhibit 1), and also a Driver Instruc-
tions Governing Enroute Meal and Routine Stops. (Ex-
hibit 2) However, so as to clearly indicate to Ashton 
that the application was being processed and the test being 
* 
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given, and the Certificates issued after completion of same, 
only for the purpose of complying with the Motor Carrier 
Safety Regulations, he was required to execute a form 
that is the last page of Exhibit 3 (R 185), and which is 
also shown as Exhibit 23 (R 208). In that document, the 
following language is contained: 
"I , Dennis A. Ashton, fully understand and agree 
that Harry L. Young & Sons Company, Inc. is not 
my employer, and that Harry L. Young & Sons, 
Inc. does not employ any drivers. The statistical 
information which I have furnished Harry L. 
Young & Sons Company, Inc. is for screening pur-
poses only, to determine whether I qualify for 
driving under Department of Transportation and 
Company Safety Regulations. 
"I also fully understand that my wages will be set 
and paid by the owner of the equipment (con-
tractor) that accepts me as his employee and driver. 
I will furnish all necessary documents to the owner 
of the equipment (Employer) to figure and de-
termine wages due me. 
*T further understand and agree that if I am 
accepted, I will abide by all Department of Trans-
portation Safety Regulations and will be conver-
sant with same." 
Young is in a position, as an Interstate Motor Carrier, 
where it must comply with certain safety regulations, and 
in doing so must insist that lease-operators hauling freight 
over its authority also comply with those regulations. It 
is, therefore, in somewhat the same position that the in-
surance company was in in the case of Christean v. Indus-
trial Commission, 113 U. 451, 196 P. 2d 502, where it, 
the company, exercised certain control over its salesmen 
» 
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consisting of his limitation to bind the company contract-
ual ly , and the right to control the result of his work, but 
not to control how the work should be done. 
The evidence in this case would indicate that it falls 
within that type of a situation. Inasmuch as the lease-
operators are operating over Young's authority, it is its 
responsibility, in complying with the Motor Carrier Safety 
Regulations, to control the overall shipping results, but 
it does not go to the extent of directing how work should 
be done in that Ashton could travel over the highways he 
desired to travel over, set his own enroute call points, and 
leave and arrive when he wanted to. Even though the 
choice of routes between Salt Lake City and Los Angeles 
going to the south and west and Salt Lake City and Oak-
land going to the west are not that numerous, Ashton, 
nonetheless could elect which route to take, and his check-
in points to advise Young as to where he then had the 
load of freight located. 
Some examples in the testimony that Ashton was 
directing his own work, and not under the control and 
direction of Young are found at R 118, as follows: 
"Q. Now as I understand the situation then, your 
testimony is you left here and went up to 
Pocatello; is that correct? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And took four days off; is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. -
" > • • 
Q. Did you get prior permission to take four days 
off? 
^ 
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A. I wouldn't call it permission. They were 
aware of the fact I was going to take time off. 
Q. So you didn't feel it was necessary to get per-
mission, did you? 
A. They don't ask me, I don't ask them. 
Q. Sure. And, based upon that custom and prac-
tice, you did in fact take four days off? 
A. That's right. I did." 
The testimony was also to the effect that he could 
refuse to take loads if he wanted to, or require that they be 
loaded to his specifications before having to take them. 
Some illustrative testimony to that effect is found at R 
163, as follows: 
"Q. Let's be sure I understand this trip. Mr. Ash-
ton. If you were directed to do something, and 
you felt it was illegal, or was in fact illegal, 
you didn't do it? Right? 
A. I refused to do it. 
Q. You weren't fired for that were you? 
A. Threatened, yes. 
Q. Were you fired for it? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you still drive with them afterwards? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Because that was your truck? Isn't that cor-
rect? You would have been legally responsi-
ble for an overweight? 
A. That's right, sir. 
W 
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And, in fact, you didn't do it? 
I did do it. 
But on your terms? 
Yes, sir. 
You still drove with them afterwards? Right? 
Yes, sir." 
As pointed out in the Statement of Facts, Ashton was 
in possession of the truck under a lease with an option 
to purchase from Inland Transport, Inc., had no payroll 
deductions made by Young, but was paid strictly on a per 
load basis depending on where he traveled, the size of 
the load, and how many miles he traveled, was paid no 
overtime, and had none of the other usual incidences of 
an employer-employee relationship, but had all of the 
incidences of an independent contractor relationship. 
This Court has dealt with the distinction between an 
employer-employee relationship and the independent con-
tractor status on numerous occasions. In the case of Mary-
land Casualty Company v. Industrial Commission, 12 
U. 2d 223, 364 P. 2d 1020, after noting that there was 
much difficulty involved in formulating an all inclusive 
and exclusive definition, set out the following guidelines 
to be considered in making that distinction, as follows: 
«# # # it is sufficient for our purpose here to ob-
serve that generally speaking an employee is one 
m 
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who is hired and paid at some designated rate, us-
ually specified as a wage or salary, to do work that 
is part of the trade or business of his employer, and 
is subject to continuous supervision, direction and 
control in performing his duties; whereas, an in-
dependent contractor is usually engaged to do 
some particular piece of work for a set sum for 
v the completed job, and is not subject to such super-
vision, direction or control, but may pursue the 
work in his own way, and is responsible only for 
completing it as required by his contract." 
In the Utah case of Sutton v. Industrial Commission 
of Utah, 9 U. 2d 339, 44 P. 2d 538, the Court also ob-
served that the elements of control by the employer and 
the intent of the parties, are the most important fac-
tors, but that none of the factors, considered separately, is 
controlling, and that all of the facts considered together 
will be used in determining whether the relationship is in 
essence that of employer-employee or of independent 
contractors. 
There have been several Utah cases dealing with 
local trucking concerns, and the question as to whether or 
not there was an employer-employee relationship or an 
independent contractor relationship existing in those 
cases. None of those cases have, however, been directly 
in point with the case at bar which deals with a lease-
operator's relationship with a regulated interstate motor 
carrier. The cases referred to, dealing with local trucking 
concerns are Kinder v. Industrial Commission, 106 U. 
448, 150 P. 2d 109; Luker Sand and Gravel v. Industrial 
Commission, 82 U. 188, 23 P. 2d 225; and Gallegos v. 
Stringham, 21 U.2d 139, 442 P. 2d 31-
n 
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In the Luker case, a truck owner hired drivers and 
pro-rated operating costs and income with them where 
they were engaged in a hauling contract for a general 
contractor. The truck owner indicated the route to be 
followed by the driver, and told him that the general 
contractor's supervisor would tell him where to go and 
how much to haul on each load. Luker directed the driver 
to put higher sides on the truck, so as to be able to carry 
more gravel, which he did, and directed the driver where 
to haul the gravel. As part of the contract, each truck 
was checked by a government inspector as they arrived 
on the job site. In holding that Luker Sand and Gravel 
was not the employer of the truck drivers, the Court ob-
served: 
"That the sand and gravel should be delivered 
at the Veterans' Hospital with reasonable expedi-
tion and as required by the government contractors 
as to quantity was all the sand and gravel company 
was interested in." 
In the Kinder case, Kinder as a driver of a third-
person's truck was hired to use that truck for the purpose 
of hauling gravel from Wasatch Sand and Gravel Pit. 
No directions were given him regarding the route he had 
to take; however, if he, or other truckers, were not haul-
ing sufficient amounts to meet the contractor's require-
ments, then, he, the contractor, could hire other truckers 
to meet the needs. There were no set rules as to hours that 
would have to be worked by the truckers, or the amount 
of time they would be given to haul any specific load. Also, 
there was no requirement as to how many loads they would 
have to haul during any given time frame. The truckers 
13 
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furnished their own trucks, paid for their own repairs, 
and operating costs such as oil and gas, and the contrac-
tor was not responsible for any of these items. Under 
that fact situation, this court held that there was no em-
ployer-employee relationship in that the only control over 
the truckers exercised by the contractor was the direction 
as to where the load should be loaded up and where it 
should be unloaded. 
The Gallegos case was distinguished from the Luker 
case and the Kinder case on its facts, inasmuch as that case 
dealt with a fact situation where a truck owner, by way of 
oral contract, agreed to furnish a truck, along with a 
driver, to the plaintiff's employer. The truck owner was 
then paid by the hour for the use of the truck, and as a 
condition of the employment, the truck had to maintain 
its position in the line of trucks so as to make sure that it 
was hauling its fair share of the overall commodity. A 
distinction that the Court pointed out was: 
"Defendant was told when to speed his trips and 
when to back up to the traxcavator and when to 
drive away, and he could not haul dirt in any other 
manner than as he was told. 
«# # * if the driver of the truck failed to main-
tain his position in line, the foreman of Gibbons 
and Reed could stop the truck from hauling. 
«* * * Because Gibbons and Reed paid $10.00 
per hour for the use of the truck, including the 
driver, it could not afford to let the driver de-
termine the amount of work to be done. Such a 
rate of pay justified and made necessary the con-
trol of the movement of the truck by the company." 
M 
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The Court, in the Gallegos case, and in distinguish-
ing it from the Luker case, the Kinder case, and other 
cases, noted the distinction was based upon the control 
exercised in the Gallegos case over the employee, which 
was lacking in the cases otherwise distinguished. 
In distinguishing the Gallegos case from the Luker 
case, the Court stated: 
"The instant case is distinguished from the Luker 
case because here Gibbons and Reed Company did 
direct and control the movement of the truck and 
the pay was by the hour and not by the cubic yards 
hauled. Gibbons and Reed would thus be decidedly 
interested in the number of trips made by String-
ham." 
With the record showing that Ashton, after entering 
into a lease-purchase agreement with Inland Transport, 
Inc. and then putting the truck to work hauling loads for 
Young, on Young's interstate authority, but, with Ashton 
deciding when he wanted to haul loads, paying for all 
of his own expenses, and receiving a settlement from 
Young based upon the number of miles between points 
the load was hauled, clearly indicates that he was an in-
dependent contractor and not an employee of Young. In 
support of this conclusion is the fact that he was not paid 
as an employee, with the usual deductions being made, 
but was paid as an independent contractor based upon 
the gross contract price. Also, when he had entered into a 
lease-purchase agreement where he had possession and 
control, and ultimate direction over the use of a certain 
vehicle, which he chose to operate for Young as a lease 
operator. Exhibit 20 (R 203) insofar as that Exhibit con-
tains registration certificates, indicates that the registered 
W 
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owner of the vehicle was Inland Transport, Inc., and 
Young appears thereon only as a lessee, inasmuch as 
Ashton, after entering into the Lease-Purchase agreement 
with Inland, leased the truck back on to Young so as to 
enable himself to operate under Young's Interstate Author-
ity. Ashton also was maintaining and repairing his ve-
hicle, was paying for his own trip permits, was paying 
his second driver, and was responsible for all overweight 
violations. None of these were paid by Young, and the 
only responsibility Young had was to pay the contract 
price on a per mile basis for the loads that Ashton elected 
to haul for Young. 
Also, even though Ashton executed a trip plan in 
connection with each load of freight he hauled, he, and 
not Young, set the time when he would leave, the points 
where he would check in, and the time when he would 
arrive. There is absolutely nothing in the record that would 
indicate that Young required him to leave at a certain time, 
check in at a certain place, and to arrive at a certain desti-
nation at a given time. Testimony of that relationship is 
clearly indicated at R 127, where the following questions 
were asked and answers given: 
"Q. Did H. L. Young & Sons, Inc. set forth any 
formal document that would require you to 
drive so many miles or take so many trips, in 
a particular period of time? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Therefore — if that be the case — your in-
come would, in a large measure, depend on 
your own ambition and how many trips you 
wanted to take? Is that a fair statement? 
A. Yes." 
1 # 
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In addition to the foregoing, Young and Ashton, from 
the time of their first contact with each other, entered into 
an agreement, heretofore cited, whereby Ashton spe-
cifically agreed and understood that he was not an em-
ployee of Young, and that Young in fact had no em-
ployees who operated trucks, but that all of the truck 
operators were independent contractors. 
The facts of this case are much closer and even 
stronger than the Luker Sand and Gravel v. Industrial 
Commission, 82 U. 188, 23 P. 2d 225, and Kinder v. In-
dustrial Commission, 106 U. 448, 150 P. 2d 109. They are 
clearly distinguishable from Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 U. 
2d 139, 442 P. 2d 31, inasmuch as the employer in that 
case was exercising considerable if not absolute control 
over the employee. That, of course, is by no means the 
case in the instant situation. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact and 
Order should be reversed, and they should be directed to 
enter new findings to the effect that Ashton was not an 
employee of Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc.; but that he was 
an independent contractor, and not entitled to workmen's 
compensation as Young's employee. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Wendell E. Bennett 
STRONG & HANNI 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Petitioner 
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